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Abstract: Scholars belong to multiple communities of credit simultaneously.  
When these communities disagree about how much credit to assign to a scholarly 
achievement, this raises a puzzle for decision theory models of credit-seeking in 
science.  The reference class problem for credit valuation in science is the 
problem of determining to which of an agent’s communities – which reference 
class – credit determinations should be indexed for any given act under any given 
state of nature.  I will identify strategies and desiderata for resolving ambiguity in 
credit valuation due to this problem and explain how pursuing its solution could, 
ironically, lead to its dissolution. 
 
1. Introduction 
Within the scientific community, there is a common understanding that its reward system 
drives problematic behavior linked to publication patterns, pipeline retention, hypercompetitive 
scientific cultures, and reproducibility. Conversely, there is also a shared sentiment that, in order 
to change these cultures and behaviors in ways that would improve science, the scientific 
community must coordinate across institutions to change how credit is assigned at the level of 
the individual scientist (Alberts et al. 2014, Nosek et al. 2015, Aalbersberg et al. 2017, National 
Academies of Sciences 2018, National Science Foundation 2015, Blank et al. 2017).  The hope is 
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that increasing individual researchers’ incentives towards increased transparency and openness 
will improve the integrity, reproducibility, and accuracy of the published record.1 
Analogously, philosophers working in the “credit economy” tradition adopt the working 
assumption that there is some amount of credit that agents can accrue for different acts under 
different states of nature.  This assumption allows them to use decision theory to model how 
credit-seeking among individual scientists can give rise to behavior and norms that support or 
thwart the achievement of community-wide goals.  When, in the aggregate, individual credit-
seeking cuts against collective ends, their approach can explore how changes to individuals’ 
incentive structures can nudge and redirect individual behavior (Bruner and O’Connor 2017, 
Rubin and O’Connor 2018, Bright 2017, Heesen 2017, Kitcher 1990, Strevens 2003, Zollman 
2018).  Different philosophers make different assumptions about the norms by which credit gets 
allotted – for example, whether credit is best thought of as all-or-nothing (Strevens 2003, Bright 
2017, Heesen 2017) or as something that may come in degrees (Bruner and O’Connor 2017, 
Rubin and O’Connor 2018, Zollman 2018).  However, the general approach assumes that there is 
some precise way to assign credit to different acts under different states of nature – an 
assumption that allows these philosophers to model credit-seeking behavior and the emergence 
of scientific norms in formally tractable ways. 
But, how much credit gets assigned to any given act under any given state of nature?  Just 
as each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple social categories each of which is tied to 
implied social hierarchies (Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne 1995, Crenshaw 1989), each 
                                                        
1 Institutions can also experience incentives that promote or thwart scientific ends (Lee and 
Moher 2017). 
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scholar simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of value with implied social hierarchies 
for assigning credit.  To which of an agent’s communities – which reference class – should credit 
determinations be indexed and why?   
In this paper, I will use examples from the current context of science’s complex and 
dynamic culture to motivate and illuminate what I will call the reference class problem for credit 
valuation in science.  I will identify a few strategies and desiderata for solving ambiguity in 
credit assignments due to the reference class problem.  And, I will say a bit about how 
developing the resources needed to solve it could ultimately sow the seeds for its own 
dissolution. 
 
2. The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 
The contours of this puzzle about the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) become 
visible when one moves beyond thinking about credit in generic, abstractions of scientific 
communities towards the heterogeneous communities we find today.  I start from this slightly 
more concrete perspective because prestige requires recognition by individuals and forums that 
are themselves valued by credit-seeking scholars (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, Lee 2013): 
credit worthiness in science is a function of the individuals and systems designed to assess, 
allocate, dispute, and enforce it.  Although some aspects of Zuckerman and Merton’s narrative 
about the origins of the normative structure of science have been contested by historians (Csiszar 
2015, Biagioli 2002), we see the social dynamics Zuckerman and Merton proposed clearly at 
play in contemporary science.  For example, Nature Publishing Group recently found that – for 
the 18,354 authors in science, engineering, and medicine surveyed – the reputation of a journal is 
the primary factor driving choices about where to submit their work, where reputation is 
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primarily determined by the journal’s impact factor and whether it is “seen as the place to 
publish the best research” (Nature Publishing Group 2015).  Factors associated with a journal’s 
ability to archive and disseminate research – things like a journal’s time from acceptance to 
publication, indexing services, or Open Access options – were much less important.2 
Within academia, each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of value.  
The reference class problem arises when these different communities of value disagree about the 
amount of credit an agent accrues for choosing some act under some state of nature.  Although I 
take this problem is be general, for the sake of clarity and simplicity in presentation, I will focus 
my examples on communities that can be described as having a nesting structure: for example, 
individual scholars belong to specific sub-disciplines, which are nested within disciplines, which 
are nested within a more general population of scholars.  A sub-population that is nested within a 
population can have a credit sub-culture whose valuations differ from that of the population, 
whose valuations can differ from that of the super-population.  In these cases, changing how 
narrowly or broadly one draws the boundaries of an agent’s community of valuation can change 
the amount of credit assigned to a scholarly accomplishment.  This gives rise to the reference 
class problem for credit valuation in science: to which of the agent’s communities – which 
reference class – should credit valuations be indexed when determining the amount of credit the 
agent accrues for different acts under different states of nature? 
                                                        
2 I recognize that some decision theorists, especially those working outside of philosophy, may 
reject or remain agnostic about attributing mental states such as beliefs to agents (Okasha 2016).  
However, because I understand credit and credit-seeking as sociological phenomena involving 
status beliefs such as these, I am committed to attributing beliefs to agents. 
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There are many examples across academia where nesting community structures can give 
rise to paradoxes and pathologies in credit assignments.  For example, scholars’ individual sense 
of what counts as quality work – their individual credit assignments – may deviate from what is 
endorsed in a sub-discipline or discipline’s status hierarchy (Correll et al. 2017, Centola, Willer, 
and Macy 2005, Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009).  A puzzle that has cachet in a sub-discipline 
may be of peripheral importance within that discipline: for example, a more accurate technique 
for measuring how temperature cools with elevation considered critical in mountain meteorology 
and mountain ecology (Mindner, Mote, and Lundquist 2010) may have less visibility, despite its 
relevance, to the larger discipline of hydrology (Livneh et al. 2013).  A question or technique 
that is thought to have high impact across fields (e.g., machine learning) may have little 
prominence within some of those fields. 
Hypothetically speaking, one could imagine differences in valuations giving rise to a 
Simpson’s paradox in credit valuation.  Simpson’s paradox is a phenomenon whereby a trend 
that appears in a population reverses or disappears when it is disaggregated into sub-populations 
(Blyth 1972).  For example, a classic study found that, when looking at aggregate graduate 
school admissions data at UC Berkeley, women were, on the whole, less likely than men to be 
accepted; however, when the data was disaggregated into admitting departments, women were 
more likely than men to be admitted (Bickel, Hammel, and O’Connell 1975).  Analogously, a 
Simpson’s paradox in credit valuation in science would occur in cases where a population-level 
preference for scholarly product a versus b reverses when the population is disaggregated into its 
component sub-populations.  In Simpson’s Paradox cases, thinking more carefully about the 
context of evaluation usually leads to using a reference class that is finer-grained than the 
population-level.  However, it’s not clear whether this would always be the case in evaluations of 
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scientific credit.  Hypothetically speaking, consider a hypothetical scenario in which an 
interdisciplinary project is not preferred by the individual disciplines represented by its authors 
or content, but is preferred when those disciplines are aggregated together.  And, imagine that 
this project gets published in a journal, valued by those disciplines, that seeks papers of interest 
across and beyond disciplines (not just within disciplines): this is one way to interpret, for 
example, Science’s mission to publish papers that “merit recognition by the wider scientific 
community and general public. . . beyond that provided by specialty journals” (Science).  Which 
reference class would be most relevant in evaluating the value of this project? 
There are other ways of dividing scholarly communities into nesting structures that create 
tensions in credit assignments.  The pressures a scholar may feel from the incentive structure 
impacting her department/school may be slightly different from the incentive structure impacting 
her university.  A coarse but concrete way to see this is to think about the prestige structure 
reified and reinforced by ranking systems (Espeland and Sauder 2012, 2016, Sauder and 
Espeland 2006), which transform “the ways professional opportunities are distributed” (Espeland 
and Sauder 2016, 7).  An untenured business school professor with a potentially high impact 
manuscript needs to burnish her prestige in the eyes of both her dean and her provost, since both 
will evaluate her tenure case.  If her provost is working to gain stature on the Academic 
Rankings of World Universities [ARWU], the professor should submit her manuscript to Science 
or Nature, since the ARWU ranks universities by their publications in these journals (Academic 
Ranking of World Universities 2018).  However, if her dean is trying to gain stature on the 
Financial Times International ranking of MBA programs, she should submit to one of the fifty 
business, economics, or psychology journals by which the FT ranking system evaluates Business 
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school prestige – notably, the journal list does not include Science or Nature (Ormans 2016).  
What should the business school professor do? 
Finally, credit assignments can vary depending on how long a time window a scholar 
keeps in view.  A coarse but concrete way to think about this is by looking at how metrics for 
evaluating scholarship change over time.  Journal impact factors are becoming less useful 
measures for evaluating an individual’s scholarly contribution: since the advent of the digital 
age, the most elite journals (including Science and Nature) are publishing a decreasing 
percentage of the top cited papers (Larivière, Lozano, and Gingras 2013); the relationship 
between journal impact factor and paper citations has declined over time (Lozano, Larivière, and 
Gingras 2012); and, the citation distributions between journals “overlap extensively” (Larivière 
et al. 2016).  The current wisdom is that if quantitative indicators are to be used to evaluate 
research, it is more useful to use article-level metrics such as citations as well as alternative 
metrics such as downloads and views (San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, 
Hicks and Wouters 2015, Wilsdon et al. 2017).  On the horizon, there are now calls for creating 
new metrics that can encourage researchers and journals to be transparent and open in their 
reporting practices (National Academies of Sciences 2018, Wilsdon et al. 2017, Aalbersberg et 
al. 2017).  Note that, the rise of such metrics – as well as the growing meta-research literature 
that ranks journals by the replicability (Schimmack 2015) or sample size and statistical power of 
their published results (Fraley and Vazire 2014) – makes it possible for a journal’s impact factor 
and epistemic credibility to come apart (Fang and Casadevall 2011). 
Decision theorists capture the risky nature of individual choices by allowing for 
uncertainty about which states of the world will come to be; and, when the probabilities attached 
to different outcomes are understood subjectively, these models permit a kind of subjectivity in 
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estimates of expected credit for different acts.  However, I hope the examples throughout this 
section animate genuine ambiguity in credit due to the reference class problem for credit 
valuation in science. 
 
3. Strategies and Desiderata for Solving the Reference Class Problem 
How might decision theorists try to solve the reference class problem for assigning credit 
in science?  One possible approach argues for the “correctness” of using one community rather 
than another.  For example, it might be tempting to argue that all prestige is discipline-based 
since many scholarly prizes are distributed for excellence in particular disciplines (e.g., Nobel 
prize, Fields prize, academic society prizes); and, even when research is funded or published in 
interdisciplinary contexts, it may be primarily evaluated on the basis of its disciplinary 
excellence (Lamont 2009, but see Lee et al. 2013).  Indexing credit valuation to a particular 
community need not prevent scholars from outside that community from understanding the 
relative value of that contribution: for example, if one were to adopt the old-fashioned and 
problematic assumption that an article’s impact can be measured by the impact factor of the 
journal in which it is published,3 and one recognizes that citations rates vary across disciplines, 
one could use field-normalized percentiles to understand a paper’s impact in a metric that is 
legible across fields (Hicks and Wouters 2015).  Because this strategy for addressing the 
                                                        
3 The citation distributions within journals are so skewed that it is statistically improper to infer 
the impact of an individual article on the basis of the impact factor of the journal in which it is 
published (San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, Hicks and Wouters 2015, 
Wilsdon et al. 2017, Larivière et al. 2016, Wilsdon et al. 2015). 
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reference class problem relies heavily on identifying the “right” community, defending the 
centrality of the chosen community as opposed to others is critical.  For example, some may 
challenge the idea that disciplines should be the sole arbiter of credit: note that the awarding of 
some scientific prizes reach across disciplinary conceptions of excellence (e.g., consider winners 
of the MacArthur Genius Prize and the psychologists who have won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics). 
Another possible approach creates an algorithm that calculates the credit value of a 
scholarly contribution by summing the credit valuation of multiple communities.  This approach 
would need to identify exactly how much to weight each community’s valuation – with a 
rationale for why – since different weightings could lead to different overall credit valuations.4  
Note that some scholars take this style of approach when trying to measure the relative prestige 
of journals: in particular, the Eigenfactor score rates journals according to the number of its 
incoming citations, where the “relative importance” of each incoming citation is contextualized 
by the frequency with which the citing journal is itself cited (West, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom 
2010). 
Those who may wish to model the implications of different approaches for solving the 
reference class problem may try to do so by setting up hypothetical communities that assign 
                                                        
4 On the face of it, this may seem like a form of commensuration because it involves summing 
values to calculate an overall score (Espeland and Stevens 1998).  However, the process of 
commensuration requires combining values across qualitatively different domains of value.  For 
clearer examples of commensuration in scholarly evaluation, see Lee (2015). 
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community boundaries and credit assignments in de facto ways to see what kinds of behaviors 
and norms emerge.   
However, to solve the underlying conceptual problem, one must provide theories of 
community and credit that address two fundamental but vexing questions.  How should one 
define and gerrymander the boundaries of the relevant communities invoked in the proposed 
solution?  And, how does one determine the amount of credit those communities would assign to 
different acts under different states of nature?  These questions may not be independently 
answerable.  The boundaries of a community may need to be defined in terms of patterns of 
shared lore among its members about how credit is accrued – shared beliefs that coordinate 
credit-seeking and enforcement behavior in cases where status beliefs are internalized as norms 
(Merton 1973) and in cases where they are not (Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009, Ridgeway 
and Correll 2006).  Conversely, in recognition that some community members can have more 
influence than others on the content of reigning status beliefs, a community’s credit assignments 
may need to be defined with some reference to the causal patterns of interaction among specific 
individuals and clusters of individuals – including status judges who wield “social control 
through their evaluation of role-performance and their allocation of rewards for that 
performance” (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, 66).  Note, however, that answers to these 
questions should not exclusively inform each other.  Notably, we must be careful not allow the 
size of a scholarly population and/or the power of its status judges to fully determine the 
intellectual value of the questions pursued by any particular partition of the scholarly universe. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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Scientific credit – the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) – is assessed, allocated, 
disputed, and enforced by many different communities and institutions within science that 
support and sustain a multiplicity of status hierarchies.  This gives rise to what I have called the 
reference class problem for credit valuation in science.  Solving this problem requires developing 
rich theories of community and credit that are based on fine-grained information about the 
structure and status systems of complex scholarly networks.  The irony of this assessment is that 
such investigation towards solving the reference class problem could ultimately sow the seeds 
for its own dissolution.   
In particular, such study can render friable a critical assumption for both the reference 
class problem and for decision theory models: namely, that communities, once defined, assign 
determinate amounts of monistic credit for different acts under different states of nature – that 
credit “can vary quantitatively but not qualitatively” (Anderson 1993, xii).5  Contrary to this, 
recent policy papers call for moving away from narrowly conceived measurements of research 
excellence towards broader ones that are sensitive to the diversity of individual researchers’, 
programs’, and academic institutions’ research missions (Hicks and Wouters 2015, Wilsdon et 
al. 2015).  Such work can include community-engaged scholarship that creates, disseminates, 
and implements knowledge in coordination with the public to identify social interventions, 
change social practice, and influence policy (Hicks and Wouters 2015, San Francisco 
Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, Boyer 1990, Escrigas et al. 2014).  From the 
                                                        
5 Note too that, for formal reasons, the assumption that individual credit assessments could be 
aggregated into a collective one is questionable given the challenges of combining individual 
preferences into collective ones (Arrow 1950). 
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perspective of these efforts, plurality in our notions of scholarly excellence and credit – and 
differences in valuation and prioritization practices between individuals and communities – may 
be best conceived, not as a logical problem to solve, but as a starting point for theorizing. 
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